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Abstract
Background: Previous studies have mostly focused on socio-demographic and health-related 
determinants of health-related behaviors. Although comprehensive health insurance coverage could 
discourage individual lifestyle improvement due to the ex-ante moral hazard problem, few studies 
have examined such effects. This study examines the association of a comprehensive set of factors 
including socio-demographic, health status, health insurance, and perceived change in health 
insurance coverage with health-related behaviors and their dynamics (ie, changes in behavior).
Methods: Using Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe  (SHARE) data (a European aging 
survey among 50+ years old) for the Netherlands in 2004 and 2007 (sample size: 1745), binary and 
multinomial logit models are employed to study health-related behaviors (daily smoking, excessive 
alcohol use, and physical inactivity in 2004) and their corresponding changes (stopping or starting 
unhealthy behavior between 2004 and 2007).
Results: Our findings show that being older, being female, having higher education and living with a 
partner increase the likelihood not to be a daily smoker or to stop daily smoking. At the same time, 
being older (OR = 3.02 [1.31, 6.95]) and being female (OR = 1.77 [1.05, 2.96]) increases the likelihood 
to be or to become physically inactive. We also find that worse perceived health insurance coverage 
in 2007 is associated with a lower likelihood (OR = 0.19 [0.06, 0.57]) of stopping excessive alcohol use 
in that year. However, we do not find a strong association between the type of health insurance and 
health behavior.
Conclusion: Our findings show that all above mentioned factors (ie, socio-demographic and health 
status factors) are associated with health-related behavior but not in a consistent way across all 
behaviors. Moreover, the dynamics of each behavior (positive or negative change) is not necessarily 
determined by the same factors that determine the state of that behavior. We also find that better 
perceived health insurance coverage is associated with a healthier lifestyle which is not compatible 
with an ex-ante moral hazard interpretation. Our results provide input to target policies towards 
elderly individuals in need of lifestyle change. However, further research should be done to identify 
the causal effect of health insurance on health-related behavior. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Health-related behavior should not be treated as a uniform concept, each behavior should rather be considered separately.
• The dynamics of health-related behavior are not necessarily associated with the same factors that determine the state of that behavior.
• A comprehensive understanding of the determinants of health-related behavior is crucial to change individuals’ behaviors into a healthier 
lifestyle. 
• Ex-ante moral hazard does not seem to undermine healthy behavior. 
Implications for public
Although some studies have found that someone who smokes is more likely also to drink excessively and be physically inactive, in this study, 
we found that different people engage in different unhealthy behaviors. Additionally, those more likely to desist from such behaviors also vary. 
Therefore, we recommend that researchers and policy-makers should consider each health behavior separately. 
Some people have argued that people should pay privately for their healthcare because people will only look after their health if they have to pay 
when something goes wrong with their health. Our study found that in the Netherlands, this is not the case: people who received more coverage 
from their health insurer looked after their health more. 
Key Messages 
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Background
Lifestyle change is an important goal of public health policy. 
The role of unhealthy behavior (ie, smoking, excessive alcohol 
use, physical inactivity) in acquiring non-communicable 
diseases (ie, diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular disease) has 
been clearly documented.1 In addition, evidence points to 
a high worldwide prevalence of unhealthy behavior.1,2 This 
has brought policy-makers to agree on the urgent need for 
individual lifestyle change.3 Thus, it is important to have a 
better understanding of the factors that determine individuals’ 
choices of unhealthy behaviors and their decisions to change 
those behaviors.
Prior research has documented that an unhealthy lifestyle is 
related to socio-demographic and health status factors.4-8 For 
instance, it has been shown that age, gender, marital status, and 
income determine the prevalence of unhealthy behaviors.4,9-17 
Some studies also show that self-perceived health is associated 
with those behaviors.6,18 Insurance coverage could also 
discourage individual lifestyle improvement and prevention 
activities, which is known as the ex-ante moral hazard 
problem.19 According to the health insurance model, ex-ante 
moral hazard is defined as the possibility that the insurance 
for curative care discourages primary prevention on the side 
of the insured.20 Few studies have actually investigated the 
role of health insurance in health-related behaviors and their 
changes.21 In addition, previous studies have mostly focused 
on only one type of unhealthy behavior,9,22-25 while it is helpful 
to find out whether the effect of variables are consistent across 
different health-related behaviors. This helps to see to what 
extent health behaviors can be considered as one concept or 
behavior-specific actions are needed. Thus, our main objective 
is to build up a comprehensive model, to our knowledge for 
the first time including health insurance variables, associated 
with the individual’s choice of unhealthy behavior and the 
decision to change those behaviors.
For this analysis, we use Dutch data from the first and the 
second wave of the Survey on Health, Aging, and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE Release 2.5.0) which were collected in 
2004 and 2007 (coincidently this was before and after the 
health insurance reform in the Netherlands). Thus, it enables 
us to enter health insurance variables in our general analysis of 
health-related behavior, making the model as comprehensive 
as possible.
Having introduced the health insurance reform in 2006, a 
universal compulsory health insurance coverage replaced 
the former public and private health insurance systems. 
Before the reform, individuals with a gross individual annual 
income up to a ceiling set by the government were entitled 
to the compulsory social insurance and those with a higher 
individual income had to buy the voluntary private health 
insurance.26 The fact that the reform took place suggests 
that the insurance coverage for some individuals might have 
changed. For example, as the new system is mandatory for 
everyone, a better insurance coverage is expected for those 
who had voluntary private insurance. Thus, we are able to 
analyze how this change is associated with the dynamics of 
health-related behaviors between 2004 and 2007. At the same 
time, it is assumed that, in 2004, social health insurance 
has provided a more generous coverage than private health 
insurance.27 Thus, we are also able to analyze how the type of 
health insurance is associated with the state of health-related 
behavior in that year. We explore whether the results are 
consistent with ex-ante moral hazard. 
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, with 
previous studies in mind, we define a comprehensive set of 
factors which includes socio-demographic, health status, 
health insurance and perceived change in health insurance 
coverage. Second, the same set of factors is exploited to 
predict three common types of health-related behaviors, daily 
smoking, alcohol consumption, and physical inactivity. This 
gives us the possibility to identify whether and to what extent 
the effects of explanatory variables are consistent among 
different behaviors. The third contribution is that, besides 
behavior per se, we also study positive and negative changes 
in behavior, which provides more insight into the dynamics 
and consistency of the effect of each factor. As a result, this 
study aims to examine the association of the above-mentioned 
factors with health-related behavior and their dynamics. 
Specifically the study explores the consistency of the effect 
of these factors across different types of behavior as well as 
across the dynamics of each type of behavior. 
Methods
Data and Study Sample
The SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status as 
well as social and family networks which is based on nationally 
representative samples of the non-institutionalized population 
aged 50 years and older in Europe. The SHARE baseline study 
has been conducted in 11 countries in 2004/2005, followed 
by second wave in 2006/2007 and a fourth wave in 2011/2012 
in 14 and 19 countries, respectively. In 2008, the third wave 
of survey, SHARELIFE, was performed to collect detailed 
retrospective life histories in 13 countries.28 The SHARE 
dataset is publicly and freely available.
In the Netherlands, the first and the second wave of the 
SHARE have been performed in 2004 and 2007. The first 
SHARE wave comprises a sample size of 2979 individuals 
(household response rate of 61.6% and individual [within 
household] response rate of 87.8%).29 The total sample in the 
second wave includes 2661 individuals, while the longitudinal 
sample consists of 1777 participants. The attrition analysis that 
we carried out shows no selective dropout from the sample in 
terms of gender or annual household gross income. However, 
it shows that those who remain in the sample compared to 
those who drop out are on average relatively younger (age 
62.52 versus 63.94, P = 0.0001), have lower education level 
(international standard classification of education, ISCED) 
and are more likely to live with a partner. Attrition analysis 
carried out by the SHARE30 does not show clear cut results 
for demographic variables that predict the attrition rate. In 
total, 1745 out of 1777 individuals in longitudinal sample 
answered all questions corresponding to three health-related 
behaviors in both years (2004 and 2007). This particular 
set of individuals forms the sample for analysis in this 
study. Because the fourth wave of SHARE has not provided 
information about the type of insurance, we could not include 
this wave in the present analysis. A more detailed description 
of the Dutch SHARE dataset, its methods, sampling frame, 
and respondents is provided elsewhere.31
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Indicators of Unhealthy Behavior
SHARE devoted a section of the questionnaire on health-
related behaviors where respondents were asked about 
smoking, alcohol consumption, and the level of physical 
activity. The measures used in the present analysis are as 
follows:
Smoking: Individuals are asked if they have ever smoked 
daily for a period of at least one year. Those who reply 
affirmatively are asked whether or not they are current 
smokers. Respondents who answer “yes” to both questions 
are classified as current daily smoker. 
Excessive alcohol use: Participants are asked about the 
frequency of drinking more than two glasses of beer, wine, or 
hard liquors (ie, almost every day, 5 or 6 days a week, 3 or 4 
days a week, once or twice a month, less than once a month, 
and not at all in the last 6 months). We use the constructed 
dummy variable by SHARE comprising information of those 
who choose the options of almost every day or five/six days a 
week. This variable is the closest approximation to more than 
the recommended level of drinking available in SHARE.
Physical inactivity: Individuals are asked how often they 
engage in vigorous activity (ie, sport, heavy housework, or 
a job that requires physical labor) or moderate activity (ie, 
activities requiring a low or moderate level of energy such as 
gardening, cleaning the car, or walking) with the following 
response options: more than once a week, once a week, one 
to three times a month, or hardly ever, or never. A dummy 
variable constructed by SHARE is used which describes 
physically inactive individuals as those who never or almost 
never engage in moderate or vigorous physical activity.
Behavior change: Health-related behavior of an individual is 
compared between 2004 and 2007. Consequently, we create 
six variables of interest to indicate the behavior changes over 
the time: three dummy variables that indicate a positive 
change (ie, for those engaged in unhealthy behavior in 2004); 
and three dummy variables that indicate a negative change 
(ie, for those who did not engage in unhealthy behavior in 
2004). As a result, we are able to run separate models for 
positive and negative change to distinguish between positive 
no change (continuing healthy behavior) and negative no 
change (continuing unhealthy behavior). For instance, in the 
positive change model, we compare those who stop smoking 
with current smokers, while in the negative change model we 
compare those who start smoking with never smokers. 
Explanatory Variables
The following groups of explanatory variables are included in 
the models. 
Demographics: For age, we create dummies to indicate four 
age categories (ie, aged 55 or under, 56-64, 65-74, and 75 or 
older). We define these age categories considering that the 
majority of our respondents are aged 55 or older, and also 
that the retirement age in the Netherlands is 65 years. The 
marital status is classified into two categories of  living with 
or without spouse or partner. For all variables, the value for 
2004 is used. 
Socio-economic status: Individuals’ educational levels are 
classified into four groups based on the ISCED-97 used 
by SHARE. Details about ISCED-97 scale can be found in 
Appendix 1. We also use quintiles of annual household gross 
income in our analysis. For these variables, the value for 2004 
is used. 
Health status: As a proxy for health condition in 2004, we use a 
self-rated question, ranking individuals’ self-perceived health 
status from poor to excellent. At the same time, a question on 
activity limitation because of a health problem (the so-called 
Global Activity Limitation Index [GALI]32) is included. Using 
the health indicators of two years, we create dummies for a 
worse or a better condition in 2007 compared to 2004. 
For a more straightforward interpretation of the results, we 
enter ‘education,’ ‘annual gross household income quintile,’ 
and ‘self-perceived health’ as continuous variables in the 
models. However, we also ran regressions for each model 
while treating them as categorical explanatory variables. 
Health insurance coverage: To indicate the individuals’ health 
insurance status at the baseline (2004), we create dummies 
for having ‘voluntary private insurance,’ having ‘social 
insurance’ or having ‘no insurance.’ In addition, the variable 
indicating individuals’ health insurance deductible is added. 
As mentioned earlier it is expected that the type of health 
insurance in 2004 depends on the level of income, thus we 
also add the interaction between annual household gross 
income quintile and the type of insurance in our models. The 
preliminary analysis showed that including interaction terms 
increased the explanatory power of the models. It should be 
added that the eligibility criteria for the type of insurance 
do not depend on age. In the second wave, respondents are 
asked to evaluate their current health insurance coverage (as 
compared to what they had in the first wave) whether there 
is a worse or a better coverage, or no change. We take this 
variable as an indicator of the perceived change in health 
insurance status. As health insurance reform has happened 
in the middle of two waves of SHARE data collection, it is 
supposed that those variables could be influenced by health 
insurance reform. A more detailed description of all variables 
used in the present analysis is provided in Appendix 1.
Analysis
A binary logistic regression is used to estimate base models 
in 2004 as well as change models for 2004-2007. The set of 
explanatory variables used for the change models is slightly 
different from the base models. The change models include 
more explanatory variables which indicate positive or negative 
changes in health status and health insurance coverage in 
2007. These models also include a dummy variable indicating 
a change in marital status between 2004 and 2007. However, 
due to a lack of data, we could not specify the direction of 
the change in marital status (if a partner is acquired or 
lost). In addition, these models only include a dummy for 
voluntary private insurance. The reason for not including 
the dummy variable of “no insurance” is the low number of 
observations. In fact, running a separate model for positive 
and negative change enables us to compare each change 
group with its corresponding no-change group (ie, those who 
continue unhealthy behavior for positive change and those 
who continue healthy behavior for negative change), while 
this is not possible in a multinominal approach. However, in 
order to get more insight into the dynamics of health-related 
behaviors, we also run a multinominal logistic regression 
with four options (ie, continue unhealthy behavior, positive 
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change, continue healthy behavior – base category, and 
negative change) while comparing all options with those who 
continue their healthy behavior in 2007. For all independent 
variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 1.5 




As Table 1 shows, in 2004 (the baseline year), the prevalence 
of daily smoking, excessive alcohol use and physical inactivity 
was 24%, 18%, and 4%, respectively. Regarding health 
insurance status, 60% of respondents had compulsory social 
insurance and 36% had a voluntary private insurance, while 
4% had no insurance. In 2007, 19% of daily smokers stopped 
daily smoking, while 3% of non-daily smokers started 
doing so; 63% of excessive alcohol users stopped excessive 
drinking, while 4% of non-excessive alcohol users started 
excessive drinking and, 58% of physically inactive individuals 
stopped physical inactivity, while 6% of physically active 
respondents started physical inactivity. As the new universal 
health insurance coverage has been introduced on the first 
of January 2006, in 2007 everyone was obliged to be insured 
under the new system. However, when individuals are asked 
to compare their health insurance coverage between 2004 and 
2007, 11% of respondents state that they had better health 
insurance coverage, while 8% report the contrary. Given the 
age specification of the SHARE dataset, our results refer to 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Group Variables Range No. (%) N (100%)
Dependent variables 
Level variables in 2004 Current daily smoking - 414 (24) 1745
Excessive alcohol use - 314 (18) 1745
Physical inactivity - 77 (4) 1745
Changes in 2007 Stop daily smoking - 80 (19) 414
Start daily smoking - 40 (3) 1331
Stop excessive alcohol use - 198 (63) 314
Start excessive alcohol use - 57 (4) 1431
Stop physical inactivity - 45 (58) 77
Start physical inactivity - 97 (6) 1668
Explanatory variables
Level variables in 2004
Age
≤55 454 (26) 1745
56-64 629 (36) 1745
65-74 444 (25) 1745
≥75 218 (13) 1745
Gender
Male 796 (46) 1745
Female 949 (54) 1745
Marital status
With partner 1388 (80) 1745
Without partner  357 (20) 1745
Education (based on ISCED)
Coding: 1-4
ISCD1 231 (13) 1745
ISCD2 701 (41) 1745
ISCD3 408 (24) 1745
ISCD4 375 (22) 1745
Perceived health
Coding: 1-5
Poor 51 (3) 1745
Fair 356 (20) 1745
Good 749 (43) 1745
Very good 336 (19) 1745
Excellent 253 (15) 1745
GALI
Limited 753 (43) 1745
Not limited 992 (57) 1745
Insurance status Private insurance 629 (36) 1735
No insurance 64 (4) 1735
Deductible
Coding: 0-4
Zero 1066 (68) 1558
0< ≤100  165 (11) 1558
100< ≤200 167 (11) 1558
200< ≤500 116 (7) 1558
<500 44 (3) 1558
Changes in 2007 Better perceived health - 113 (6) 1745
Worse perceived health - 447 (26)  1745
Non-limited GALI - 244 (14) 1745
Limited GALI - 189 (18)  1745
Better health insurance coverage - 189 (11) 1745
Worse health insurance coverage - 137 (8)  1745
Abbreviations: ISCED, International Standard Classification of Education; GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
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people aged 50 and over.
Regression Results
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the regression results for our base 
models in 2004, as well as for positive and negative change 
models between 2004 and 2007, respectively. All regression 
models are statistically significant (see the models’ chi-square 
in the tables)  except the one for a positive change in physical 
inactivity. For this non-significant model, we present the best 
specification we could obtain. 
As previously noted, we also ran regressions for each model 
while treating “education,” “annual gross household income 
quintile,” and “self-perceived health” as categorical explanatory 
variables but because this did not change the results, we keep 
the models as presented in the tables. Apart from that, we used 
the likelihood ratio test to see whether or not analysis should 
be stratified based on gender. However, the test did not show 
statistically significant results for daily smoking and excessive 
alcohol use. In case of physical inactivity, a gender-stratified 
analysis was not possible because of the very low number of 
observations per gender. In addition, as a robustness check 
we separated out those with limitations on activity (GALI) in 
the regression of physical inactivity (our base model in 2004) 
but the results did not significantly change. Doing the same 
was not possible in case of positive change in physical activity 
in 2007 because of an insufficient number of observations. 
However, while leaving those with limitation on activity out 
from the model of negative change in physical activity (2007), 
the effect of age and gender on starting physical inactivity 
disappeared. Thus, the effect of age and gender on becoming 
physically inactive in 2007 (as reported in Table 4) seems to 
be mostly driven by those who have limitation on activity. 
Below, the regression results are summarized based on the 
explanatory variables.
Socio-demographic and Socio-economic Variables
The influence of socio-demographic variables on health 
behaviors can be summarized as follows based on the logistic 
regression results.
Age: Table 2 shows that in 2004, those who are in the oldest age 
category (age ≥75) have the lowest likelihood of daily smoking 
(OR = 0.25 [0.25, 0.41]). Those aged 75 or older are, however, 
considerably more likely to be physically inactive (OR = 4.48 
[1.86, 10.83]) in 2004 (Table 2) or become physically inactive 
(OR = 3.02 [1.31, 6.95]) in 2007 (Table 4).
Gender: As depicted in Table 2, women are less likely than 
men to smoke daily (OR = 0.74 [0.58, 0.95]) and to excessively 
use alcohol (OR = 0.55 [0.41, 0.73]). The results of the change 
Table 2. Health-Related Behavior in 2004 (Logit Estimates)
Daily Smoking Excessive Alcohol Use Physical Inactivity
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Explanatory variables 
Age ≤55 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Age 56-64 0.75a [0.56, 1.01] 1.36a [0.97, 1.91] 1.12 [0.46, 2.68]
Age 65-74 0.43c [0.30, 0.61] 1.03 [0.69, 1.54] 2.05 [0.87, 4.86]
Age ≥75 0.25c [0.15, 0.41] 0.68 [0.39, 1.17] 4.48c [1.86, 10.83]
Male 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Female 0.74b [0.58, 0.95] 0.55c [0.41, 0.73] 1.59 [0.90, 2.81]
Living without partner 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Living with partner 0.74a [0.54, 1.02] 1.25 [0.84, 1.87] 1.11 [0.58, 2.12]
Educationd 0.82c [0.71, 0.95] 1.09 [0.93, 1.28] 1.03 [0.73, 1.44]
Annual HH gross income quintiled 1.01 [0.90, 1.14] 1.05 [0.91, 1.21] 0.99 [0.76, 1.29]
Perceived healthd 0.79c [0.69, 0.91] 1.07 [0.92, 1.25] 0.32c [0.22, 0.47]
GALI, not-limited 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
GALI, limited 0.68c [0.51, 0.90] 0.86 [0.63, 1.18] 0.80 [0.42, 1.52]
Health insurance deductibled 0.95 [0.83, 1.09] 1.00 [0.87, 1.15] 0.90 [0.62, 1.29]
Social insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Private insurance 0.34b [0.15, 0.77] 0.49 [0.20, 1.17] 1.59 [0.35, 7.19]
No insurance 1.59 [0.25, 10.08] 0.75 [0.11, 4.87] 0.07 [0.00, 430.57]
Interaction
HH income quintile * Private insurance 1.24a [1.00, 1.54] 1.28b [1.02, 1.61] 0.85 [0.54, 1.35]
HH income quintile * NO insurance 0.75 [0.44, 1.28] 1.27 [0.77, 2.10] 1.73 [0.21, 14.24]
Other model specification Pseudo R2 .050 Pseudo R2  .053 Pseudo R2  .159
Model χ2 (14)c 86.09 Model χ2 (14)c 76.71 Model χ2 (14)c  83.83
N (included in analysis) 1533 1533 1533
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level; d Treated as continuous variable based on classification and coding depicted in Table 1.
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models 2004-2007 (Tables 3 and 4) also show that being a 
female rather than a male considerably increases the odds of 
stopping excessive alcohol use (OR = 2.57 [1.40, 4.70]) and 
decreases the odds of starting excessive alcohol use (OR = 0.32 
[0.17, 0.62]). However, it increases the odds of becoming 
physically inactive (OR = 1.77 [1.05, 2.96]). 
Education: As shown in Table 2, the likelihood of being a daily 
smoker in 2004 decreases as the level of education increases 
(OR = 0.82 [0.71, 0.95]). In addition, among those who are 
engaged in extensive or moderate physical activity in 2004, 
higher-educated individuals have lower odds (OR = 0.66 
[0.49, 0.89]) to negatively change their behavior and become 
physically inactive in 2007 compared to lower-educated 
individuals (Table 4).
Annual gross household income quintile: As mentioned earlier, 
we include the interaction term between income and the 
type of insurance in our models which appears statistically 
significant for excessive alcohol use and stopping excessive 
alcohol use. Thus, the effect of income among those with 
private insurance is determined by the two corresponding 
odds ratios (ie, income quintile and interaction term between 
income quintile and having private insurance). Our results 
show that a one unit increase in household income quintile 
increases the odds of excessive alcohol use (OR = 1.34) in 
2004. At the same time, one unit increase in household 
income quintile increases the odds of stopping excessive 
alcohol use (OR = 1.69)[1]. Among those with compulsory 
social health insurance, the effect of income quintile is not 
statistically significant for both health-related behaviors and 
change in behaviors.
The results of the multinominal approach can be found in 
Appendix 2, with the base category of those who continue 
healthy behavior, show that those who are in an older age 
group, live with a partner, and have more education in 2004 
are less likely to continue daily smoking in 2007. Women are 
also less likely to continue excessive alcohol use. 
Health Status Variables
Our findings demonstrate that a one unit increase in self-
perceived health decreases the odds of daily smoking 
Table 3. Positive Change in Health-Related Behavior in 2007 (Logit Estimates)
Stop Daily  Smoking Stop Excessive Alcohol Use Stop Physical Inactivity
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Explanatory variables
Age ≤55 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Age 56-64 1.78 [0.88, 3.58] 1.24 [0.61, 2.51] 0.28 [0.01, 6.11]
Age 65-74 1.45 [0.61, 3.43] 1.00 [0.43, 2.31] 21.67a [0.69, 678.13]
Age ≥75 0.28 [0.03, 2.35] 1.11 [0.36, 3.43] 11.95 [0.39, 369.78]
Male 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Female 0.60a [0.33, 1.10] 2.57c [1.40, 4.70] 1.28 [0.25, 6.61]
Living without partner 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Living with partner 3.71b [1.31, 10.52] 0.71 [0.30, 1.67] 9.65b [1.22, 76.43]
Educationd 1.10 [0.78, 1.55] 0.95 [0.68, 1.34] 1.32 [0.48, 3.61]
Annual HH gross income quintiled 1.08 [0.82, 1.43] 1.00 [0.74, 1.36] 0.88 [0.35, 2.20]
Perceived healthd 1.44b [1.02, 2.04] 1.36a [1.00, 1.85] 0.56 [0.16, 1.94]
GALI, not-limited 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
GALI, limited 0.74 [0.31, 1.76] 0.81 [0.36, 1.86] 0.13 [0.00, 5.54]
Health insurance deductibled 1.40b [1.02, 1.92] 1.13 [0.84, 1.52] 0.40a [0.15, 1.10]
Social insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Private insurance 0.47 [0.05, 4.18] 0.08c [0.01, 0.50] 0.09 [0.00, 16.17]
Change in 2007
Same or worse perceived health 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Better perceived health 2.53 [0.60, 10.60] 0.77 [0.25, 2.39] - -
Same or better perceived health 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Worse perceived health 3.96c [1.90, 8.23] 1.70 [0.84, 3.43] 0.07b [0.01, 0.64]
No change in limited GALI 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Non-limited GALI 2.44a [0.89, 6.73] 1.00 [0.38, 2.60] 2.04 [0.12, 33.68]
No change in non-limited GALI 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Limited GALI 0.75 [0.33, 1.72] 0.88 [0.43, 1.80] 0.27 [0.01, 6.02]
Same or worse health insurance coverage 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Better health insurance coverage  0.46 [0.14, 1.52] 2.61a [0.97, 7.05] 49.52a [0.90, 2716.75]
Same or better health insurance coverage 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Worse health insurance coverage 0.98 [0.32, 2.99] 0.19c [0.06, 0.57] - -
Interaction
HH income quintile* Private insurance 1.09 [0.63, 1.86] 1.69b [1.05, 2.70] 1.40 [0.36, 5.48]
Other model specification Pseudo R2  .125 Pseudo R2  .107 Pseudo R2  .344
Model χ2(18)c 43.39 Model χ2(18)c   38.57 Model χ2(18)a   26.46
N (included in analysis) 361 272 57
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level; d Treated as continuous variable based on classification and coding depicted in Table 1.
The age groups are compared to age ≤55.
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(OR = 0.79 [0.69, 0.91]) and physical inactivity (OR = 0.32 
[0.22, 0.47]) in 2004 (Table 2) and the odds of their negative 
change (ie, start daily smoking and start physical inactivity) in 
2007 (OR = 0.57 [0.36, 0.90] and 0.53 [0.38, 0.73], respectively) 
(Table 4). It also increases the odds of a positive change in 
smoking (OR = 1.44 [1.02, 2.04]) (Table 3). Those who perceive 
a deterioration in their health condition between 2004 and 
2007 are considerably more likely (OR = 3.96 [1.90, 8.23]) to 
quit daily smoking (Table 3), but also to become physically 
inactive (OR = 2.00 [1.19, 3.34]) (Table 4) than those who do 
not perceive any change in health status. 
The results of the multinominal model show that those who 
have a higher self-perceived health in 2004 are less likely to 
continue daily smoking as well as physical inactivity in 2007. 
At the same time, those with limited GALI in 2007 are less 
likely to continue daily smoking in 2007 (see Appendix 2).
Health Insurance Variables
As mentioned earlier, the interaction term between the 
type of health insurance and income quintile is statistically 
significant for excessive alcohol use and stopping excessive 
alcohol use. As a result, the effect of the type of health 
insurance is determined by the two corresponding odds 
ratios (ie, having private insurance and interaction term 
between income quintile and having private insurance). Thus, 
among the individuals at the lowest income quintile (income 
quintile = 1), those with voluntary private insurance rather 
than those with compulsory social insurance have lower odds 
of excessive alcohol use (OR = 0.62) in 2004 as well as lower 
odds of stopping excessive alcohol use between 2004 and 2007 
(OR = 0.13)[2]. However, among individuals in the highest 
income quintile, those with private insurance rather than 
those with compulsory social insurance have higher odds of 
excessive alcohol use (OR = 1.68) in 2004, as well as higher 
odds of stopping excessive alcohol use (OR = 1.10) in 2007. 
To double check our results, we also calculated the marginal 
effect of the income quintile as well as the incremental effect of 
having private insurance on the conditional probability of the 
Table 4. Negative Change in Health-Related Behavior in 2007 (Logit Estimates)
Start Daily Smoking Start Excessive Alcohol Use Start Physical Inactivity
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Explanatory variables
Age ≤55 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Age 56-64 1.81 [0.73, 4.53] 1.60 [0.77, 3.33] 1.21 [0.58, 2.54]
Age 65-74 0.43 [0.12, 1.47] 0.99 [0.41, 2.37] 1.66 [0.77, 3.56]
Age ≥75 0.55 [0.14, 2.17] 0.24a [0.05, 1.14] 3.02c [1.31, 6.95]
Male 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Female 1.24 [0.59, 2.62] 0.32c [0.17, 0.62] 1.77b [1.05, 2.96]
Living without partner 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Living with partner 0.67 [0.27, 1.68] 0.53a [0.26, 1.10] 1.34 [0.71, 2.52]
No change in marital status 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Change in marital status 1.95 [0.40, 9.51] 0.68 [0.08, 5.48] 1.87 [0.68, 5.15]
Educationd 1.04 [0.68, 1.59] 1.35a [0.95, 1.93] 0.66c [0.49, 0.89]
Annual HH gross income quintiled 0.75 [0.52, 1.08] 0.92 [0.67, 1.25] 0.99 [0.77, 1.27]
Perceived healthd 0.57b [0.36, 0.90] 0.97 [0.68, 1.38] 0.53c [0.38, 0.73]
GALI, not-limited 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
GALI, limited 0.21b [0.05, 0.82] 0.78 [0.32, 1.94] 1.91 [0.87, 4.19]
Health insurance deductibled 1.09 [0.77, 1.55] 1.01 [0.77, 1.34] 0.93 [0.70, 1.24]
Social insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Private insurance 0.29 [0.03, 2.58] 0.52 [0.09, 3.08] 1.44 [0.38, 5.46]
Change in 2007
Same or worse perceived health 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Better perceived health 1.42 [0.44, 4.57] 0.90 [0.26, 3.15] 0.48 [0.11, 2.10]
Same or better perceived health 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Worse perceived health 1.63 [0.68, 3.92] 1.58 [0.76, 3.29] 2.00c [1.19, 3.34]
No change in limited GALI 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Non-limited GALI 6.96c [1.85, 26.19] 1.49 [0.54, 4.14] 0.66 [0.29, 1.46]
No change in non-limited GALI 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Limited GALI 2.31a [0.92, 5.85] 1.27 [0.55, 2.94] 3.18c [1.48, 6.83]
Same or worse health insurance coverage 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Better health insurance coverage 0.14a [0.02, 1.12] 1.17 [0.50, 2.77] 0.89 [0.39, 2.00]
Same or better health insurance coverage 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
Worse health insurance coverage 0.25 [0.03, 1.94] 1.49 [0.55, 3.99] 0.32a [0.09, 1.10]
Interaction
HH income quintile* private insurance 1.41 [0.77, 2.59] 1.25 [0.78, 2.02] 1.10 [0.75, 1.63]
Other model specification Pseudo R2 .128 Pseudo R2.079 Pseudo R2.163
Model χ2(19)c  39.58 Model χ2(19)b  39.92 Model χ2(18)c 102.52
N (included in analysis) 1162 1257 1470
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level; d Treated as continuous variable based on classification and coding depicted in Table 1.
The age groups are compared to age ≤55.
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respective behavior when taking into account the interaction 
term (all appeared consistent with odds ratio we present). 
With regard to the effect of change in health insurance 
coverage on a change in health-related behavior, our results 
(Table 3) show that those with a worse health insurance 
coverage in 2007 compared to 2004 are less likely (OR = 0.19 
[0.06, 0.57]) to stop excessive alcohol use in 2007. The effect of 
changes in health insurance coverage on positive or negative 
change in two other health-related behaviors analyzed in this 
study did not appear to be statistically significant. 
Considering the results of our multinominal approach (see 
Appendix 2), we find that those with a better perceived 
insurance coverage in 2007 are less likely to continue daily 
smoking and excessive alcohol use in that year. Those with 
worse perceived health insurance coverage in 2007 are more 
likely to pursue excessive alcohol use at the same year. We also 
find that those with private insurance in 2004 have higher 
odds of continuing daily smoking in 2007. The size of this 
effect also depends on the level of the annual household gross 
income quintile. That is belonging to a higher income quintile 
in 2004 increases the chance of continuing daily smoking in 
2007.
Discussion
Our study is one of few33,34 which analyzes the joint effect 
of socio-economic, health status, and health insurance 
coverage on three health-related behaviors (ie, daily smoking, 
excessive alcohol use, and physical inactivity) as well as the 
changes in these behaviors. Much research so far has solely 
focused on socio-economic factors and health status.4-8 Most 
studies have examined the effect of some of these factors on 
only one type of unhealthy behavior.9,22-25 Few studies have 
actually considered health insurance as a potential factor 
which due to ex-ante moral hazard can also have an effect 
on individuals’ health-related behavior. In addition to using 
a comprehensive set of factors (ie, socio-economic, health 
status, and health insurance coverage), we exploit the same 
set of factors for all behaviors. This gives us the possibility to 
show whether and to what extent the effects of explanatory 
variables are consistent among different behaviors. Moreover, 
the panel nature of our dataset enables us to analyze how 
changes in health-related behavior can be related to changes 
in health status or health insurance coverage. However, it 
should be emphasized again that given the age specification 
of the SHARE dataset, our results refer to people aged 50 
and over. It should be also noted that in order to name those 
above mentioned behaviors health-related behaviors, we 
have referred to previous literature1 which considers those 
behaviors as unhealthy behaviors due to their important role 
in acquiring chronic diseases regardless of their potential 
direct effect on individuals’ health status.
Indicators of Health-Related Behaviors
We find that the most consistent predictor of health-related 
behavior among all three behaviors is gender although it 
affects each behavior differently. Previous studies also find 
that the most common types of health-related behaviors are 
gender-specific, which is of interest for health promotion 
activities.9,10,16 Although, our results regarding the socio-
economic determinants of daily smoking are compatible with 
previous studies,4,9-15 we did not capture all associations found 
in previous studies for alcohol consumption.10,17 This may to a 
certain extent be because of the variation in the way drinking 
behavior is measured and reported in different studies.11 It 
can also be explained by the fact that we use a wider range 
of factors which might pick up the effect of other socio-
economic variables. 
Our findings show that each health behavior has its own set of 
determinants. As a result, health-related behavior cannot be 
treated as one concept and each behavior should be considered 
separately. For instance, we find that men are vulnerable 
to smoking and excessive alcohol use, while those who are 
older are vulnerable to physical inactivity. These findings can 
provide a framework in targeting policies for health programs 
aimed at individuals’ behavioral change towards a healthier 
lifestyle. 
Indicators of Change in Health-Related Behavior
In our study a number of baseline factors and change events 
predict behavior change, but these are not consistent across all 
three health-related behaviors. This applies regardless of how 
we model the change (either using a logit or a multinominal 
approach). For instance, women are more likely to stop heavy 
drinking while, at the same time, they are also more likely to 
become physically inactive. In addition, living with a partner 
which could encourage positive change in smoking behavior 
and physical activity, has no such effect on changing drinking 
behavior. These results are also consistent with previous 
studies.11,12,35,36 
Health-related variables seem to be the most consistent 
predictors of changes among all health-related behaviors. 
An optimal self-perceived health in baseline year (2004) 
encourages positive and discourages negative change in 
health-related behavior. While our findings imply that 
people with poorer self-perceived health are those who tend 
to undertake more unhealthy behaviors (daily smoking and 
physical inactivity in current analysis), there is also evidence 
showing the role of unhealthy behavior as a cause of poor self-
perceived health.6,18 This indicates a limitation of our study 
since we are not able to establish whether poor self-perceived 
health is caused by smoking or vice versa.
Nevertheless, we find that a deteriorated self-perceived health 
in the follow-up year (2007) compared to the baseline year 
(2004) leads individuals to quit smoking, but to start physical 
inactivity. For smoking, it may be due to the fact that our 
sample includes predominantly elderly persons and at this 
age, the long-term health consequences of smoking are 
experienced by the elderly themselves or by others of their 
own age, which may make them more conscious about the 
need to change. For physical inactivity, it may be due to 
individuals’ lower ability for physical activity over time. This is 
also consistent with our results for GALI as we find that those, 
whose GALI changed from not-limited to limited, are more 
likely to become physically inactive. As mentioned earlier, the 
GALI measures the limitation on activity which is because of 
a health problem. Thus, becoming physically inactive might 
be a part of the normal process of aging and then could not 
be totally considered as a negative change in health-related 
behavior. Nevertheless, physical inactivity as defined by the 
SHARE means not even engaging in activities that require 
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a moderate level of energy such as gardening, doing a walk, 
etc. It might imply a sedentary lifestyle which should raise 
concern given the fact that the large body of evidence points 
toward its role in increasing all-cause mortality.37 On this 
account, even though the aging process might increase the 
interval of physical activity or shift it to a mildly energetic 
activity, it should not completely stop it. It should be noted 
that this interpretation is based on individual behavior. It is 
well-documented that social ties and supports may have a very 
important role to sustain or improve health behavior.38 Some 
studies have shown that family support for physical activity, 
and household inventory for physical activity equipment have 
a direct effect on physical activity.39 It is also worth noting that 
when we left those with limitation on activity out from the 
model of negative change in physical activity (2007), the effect 
of age and gender on starting physical inactivity disappeared. 
Thus, the effect of age and gender on becoming physically 
inactive in 2007 (as reported in Table 3) seems to be mostly 
driven by those who have limitation on activity.
This shows that the dynamics of each behavior (positive or 
negative change) is not necessarily determined by the same 
factors determining the state of that behavior. In other words, 
factors that affect a given health-related behavior might have 
no association with the change in this behavior. However, 
our results show that when a factor has an effect, its effect 
is consistent among the state and dynamics of that behavior. 
For instance, we find that women are more likely to stop 
excessive alcohol use and less likely to start excessive alcohol 
use. Similarly, we find that those who live with a partner 
have more chance to quit daily smoking. Both findings are 
consistent with our results from the baseline year indicating 
that women are less likely to be excessive alcohol users and 
that daily smoking is less prevalent among those who live 
with a partner. This consistency can clearly be used to identify 
population groups that are most likely to have an unhealthy 
lifestyle.
It might be argued that the change in health-related behavior 
might be due to some policy change. For instance, the ban on 
smoking would affect smoking behavior. In the Netherlands 
smoking has been banned in government building and public 
places (since 1990) and in workplace (since 2004) with the 
exception of the hospitality industry. However, as smoking 
ban in public places dates back to many years prior to 2004, it 
cannot be considered as a new policy change. However, given 
the data at hand, we are not able to grasp the effect of smoking 
ban in workplace on our study population. It is worth noting 
that starting daily smoking at older age is most probably a 
relapse, because previous studies has already shown that 
starting smoking for the first time even after the age of 25 is 
very unlikely.25
Income and Health Insurance-Related Indicators
We discuss here the effect of health insurance together with 
the effect of income, as in our study, their effects on health-
related behaviors are dependent to each other due to the 
specificities of the Dutch healthcare system. We find an effect 
of income only among those who had private insurance in 
2004. That is, being in a higher income quintile increases 
the odds of excessive alcohol use. Previous studies have 
shown that alcohol consumption is associated with higher 
income,17,40 while, in contrast, smoking is associated with 
lower income.4,9,10,15 However, our results should be interpreted 
given the specificity of private insurance in the Netherlands. 
As mentioned in the Background section, individuals whose 
annual individual gross income was higher than a certain level 
set by the government were not eligible for compulsory social 
insurance. They could voluntarily buy private insurance. 
However, income was not the only factor that determines the 
type of health insurance. Besides those who bought voluntary 
health insurance, private health insurance also included 
two other categories of individuals whose income were the 
same or even lower than those insured by compulsory social 
insurance. Public servants and elderly people with low-income 
had private insurance, but were in many respects more similar 
to people with social insurance. In other words, people with 
private insurance comprised a quite heterogeneous group in 
terms of income. This might explain why the effect of income 
is observed only among this group and not among those 
with compulsory social insurance which seems to be a more 
homogenous group in terms of income.
At the same time, the combined effect of income and type 
of insurance deters us to draw a general conclusion about 
the effect of type of insurance. Moreover, the type of health 
insurance in the Netherlands in 2004 mainly referred to 
differences in financing and not necessarily to a difference in 
health insurance coverage. 
Nevertheless, for some health-related behavior analyzed in 
this study, we find that worse perceived health insurance 
coverage in 2007 is associated with a lower likelihood of 
a positive change (eg, stopping excessive alcohol use) in 
that year. Our results also show that those individuals, who 
reported that they had a better insurance coverage in 2007 
than 2004, tend not to continue their unhealthy lifestyle in 
2007 while those who reported that their health insurance 
coverage had deteriorated tend to continue their unhealthy 
lifestyle. These results are not supportive for the existence of 
ex-ante moral hazard, and even imply the contrary. Because, 
should ex-ante moral hazard exists, we expect that a positive 
change in health insurance coverage (having perceived a 
better coverage in 2007) leads to negative change in health 
behavior (eg, start smoking, excessive alcohol use or physical 
inactivity). However, as mentioned above, our results show 
the opposite. Previous studies on the effect of health insurance 
on health behavior have come to contradictory conclusions. 
Some studies show that individuals without health insurance 
are more likely to undertake healthy behavior than those who 
have social health insurance.34 In contrast, other studies find a 
higher tendency for healthy behavior among privately insured 
people who enjoy a more generous insurance coverage.33 
Despite this contradiction in the findings of different studies, 
it is often noted that ex-ante moral hazard is unlikely to be 
a significant problem in the context of health insurance. It 
is because of the nature of health which is an ‘irreplaceable 
commodity.’ Thus, a health loss is never fully insured, which 
means that there are always incentives for the prevention of 
illness.
A recent study by Dave and Keastner19 put forth an explanation 
why ex-ante moral hazard might not be seen as a significant 
problem in health insurance. They describe a direct and an 
indirect effect of health insurance on health behavior. They 
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explain that health insurance on the one hand, increases the 
contact with physician and thus the patient will have easier 
access to their advice and consultation. On the other hand, 
health insurance may have a direct moral hazard effect on 
health behavior which reduces the incentive for prevention. 
Thus, the existence of these two offsetting effects makes 
a detection of a pure ex-ante moral hazard even harder. 
Dave and Keastner19 show that if contacts with a medical 
professional are controlled for, obtaining health insurance 
reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behavior in the 
United States. Consequently, they advise policy-makers to 
remove copayments and annual deductible applied to visits 
the physician in order to encourage more contacts with 
medical professional.
However, the explanation provided by Dave and Keastner19 
seems hardly applicable to other settings than the United 
States. For instance, in some European countries, no fee 
is applicable for visits to general practitioner (GP).41 In 
addition, the healthcare system is designed to provide access 
to primary care where a GP plays an important role not only 
as a first contact for the patient, but also as a gate keeper for 
the healthcare system. For instance, in the Netherlands the 
basic package always includes visits to the GP and also the 
mandatory deductible does not hold for a visit to the GP. 
Nevertheless, the existing evidence about ex-ante moral 
hazard in Europe is limited and mixed, thus not convincing.
Yet, it is important to notice that individually perceived change 
in health insurance coverage should not be interpreted as the 
effect of the reform. As mentioned earlier, given the data at 
hand, our analysis is not designed to study the effect of health 
insurance reform in the Netherlands. Instead, it is limited to 
explore factors, including health insurance, associated with 
an individual’s choice of unhealthy behavior and the decision 
to change this behavior which accordingly limits a causal 
interpretation of the results. There are also other limitations to 
be acknowledged. Although an unhealthy diet is considered a 
rather common health-related behavior, we could not include 
it in our study because it has not been included in the SHARE 
section on health-related behaviors. The other limitation is 
the one that self-reported data, in general, would pose on 
the analysis. Also, we could not study the effect of having no 
insurance on changes in behavior since the change models 
ran very low on the number of observation for this group. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Having exploited the same set of factors for three health-
related behaviors and their positive or negative change, we are 
able to make a comparison across different health behaviors 
among people at age 50 or older. These findings show that 
a variety of factors (ie, socio-demographic, socio-economic, 
health status, and health insurance coverage) are associated 
with health-related behaviors but not in a consistent way across 
all behaviors. Moreover, the dynamics of a health-related 
behavior and the state of that behavior are not necessarily 
associated with the same factors. Therefore, health-related 
behavior could not be treated as one concept and each 
behavior should rather be considered separately. Thus, our 
results provide inputs to target policies towards individuals in 
need of lifestyle change. More effort is needed to target men 
and affluent people to quit smoking and excessive alcohol use, 
as well as women and the elderly to become physically more 
active. The combined effect of income and type of insurance, 
which is one specification of  Dutch health insurance system in 
2004, deters us to see the effect of type of insurance. However, 
we find that better perceived health insurance coverage is 
associated with a healthier lifestyle which is not compatible 
with an ex-ante moral hazard interpretation. It suggests that 
what we have found is not compatible with ex-ante moral 
hazard interpretation. Thus, policy-makers should not be 
so worried that insurance coverage for preventive services 
and facilities which make preventive activities more feasible, 
would lead to less prevention. Therefore, subsidizing primary 
prevention and providing financial incentive to engaging 
individual in healthier lifestyle can be recommended. Future 
research should be designed to identify a causal effect of 
health insurance on health behavior in different countries, 
accounting, at the same time, for the context of each country 
to separate the effect of institutions from the pure effect of 
insurance. 
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Endnotes
[1] Let β1, β2, and β12 denote the coefficients related to annual gross household 
income quintile, private insurance, and the interaction term, respectively. Then, 
the odds ratio of respective dependent variable for one unit change in income 
quintile is calculated by eβ1*eβ12 among those with private health insurance. 
Having substituted odds ratio from Tables 2-4 we get the odds ratio for respective 
behavior as presented in the text, that are: 1.34 (1.05*1.28) and 1.69 (1*1.69) 
for excessive alcohol use, and stopping excessive alcohol use, respectively. 
However, the corresponding odds ratio for those with compulsory social 
insurance is eβ1 which is the odds ratio of respective behavior for annual gross 
household income quintile as presented in Tables 2-4.
[2] Using the same denotation as previous footnote, the difference between the 
odds ratio of respective behavior for those with private insurance and those 
with compulsory social insurance is calculated by eβ2*e β12*income quintile. Thus, in the 
lowest income quintile (income quintile = 1), having substituted respective odds 
ratio from the Tables 2-4 we will get the odds ratio presented in the text, that 
are: 0.62 (0.49*1.28^1) for excessive alcohols as well as 0.13 (0.08*1.69^1) for 
stopping excessive alcohol use. To get the respective odds ratio in the highest 
income quintile (income quintile = 5) as presented in the text, the number 1 
should be replace by 5.
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Appendix 1
Variables and Coding Used in 
the Analysis
Original Variables in 
the SHARE Dataset Variable Description
Dependent variable




This variable indicates whether the participant is daily smoker. Participants were first asked 
if they had ever smoked cigarettes, cigars, cigarillos or a pipe daily for a period of at least 
one year. If they replied in the affirmative, they were asked whether or not they smoked at 
present time. Respondents who answered “Yes” to both questions are classified as current 
daily smoker.




This variable indicates the cases of heavy drinking defined by SHARE as drinking more than 
two glasses of any of the three main drinks (ie, beer, wine, hard liquor) almost every day or 
five/six days a week. The variable is constructed by SHARE based on variables BR011, BR012, 
and BR013. These variables contain information on the frequency of drinking more than two 
glasses of beer, wine and hard liquor, respectively. 
To collect data for variable BR011, the following question was asked: “During the last 6 months, 
how often have you had more than two glasses or cans of beer or cider in a single day?” The 
following response options were given: 1. Almost every day; 2. Five or six days a week; 3. Three 
or four days a week; 4. Once or twice a week; 5. Once or twice a month; 6. Less than once a 
month; 7. Not at all in the last 6 months.






This variable indicates the presence of physical inactivity. It is constructed by SHARE based on 
variables BR015 and BR016. Physical inactivity is defined as never or almost never engaged in 
neither moderate nor vigorous physical activity as defined by the following questions: 
BR015 SPORTS OR ACTIVITIES THAT ARE VIGOROUS “How often do you engage in vigorous 
physical activity, such as sports, heavy housework, or a job that involves physical labor?” 
BR016 ACTIVITIES REQUIRING A MODERATE LEVEL OF ENERGY “How often do you engage in 
activities that require a low or moderate level of energy such as gardening, cleaning the car, 
or doing a walk?“
For both questions, the response categories were defined as follows: 1. More than once a 








This variable shows the level of participant’s education according to the 1997 ISCED which 
is used by SHARE for international comparison. In the Netherlands, the name of the degree 
mentioned by the participant during the interview was mapped by the local experts to the 
respective ISCED coding. 
Annual gross household income 
quintile 
Ranging from  
1 = Lowest quintile to  
5 = Highest quintile
hgtincv
This variable provides information on annual gross household income of the participant in 
2004. It is generated by SHARE and includes all source of income for each individual in the 
household (i.e. income from employment and self-employment, all types of pensions, income 
from rent) and also other sources of income at a household level (i.e. household interest 
income from bank accounts, bonds, or mutual funds). We use the quintile of this variable in 
our model as independent variable.
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Variables and Coding Used in 
the Analysis
Original Variables in 
the SHARE Dataset Variable Description
Self-perceived health 
Ranging from 1 = poor  
to 5 = excellent 
SPHUS
This variable is based on variables PH003&PH0052 in the SHARE dataset, which contains 
responses to the following question:
“Would you say your health is: 1. Excellent; 2. Very good; 3. Good; 4. Fair; 5. Poor?”
For more convenient interpretation we use the reversed order of this variable in our model so 
that the higher number shows higher perceived health status.
Global Activity Limitation Index 
0 = not limited  
1 = limited 
GALI
This variable is generated by SHARE and it indicates the global activity limitation index of a 
participant. It is based on variable PH005 in the SHARE dataset, which was obtained using the 
following question: 
“For the past six months at least, to what extent have you been limited because of a health 
problem in activities people usually do?” The response categories were: 1. Severely limited; 2. 
Limited, but not severely; 3. Not limited.
Thus, variable GALI dichotomizes these three response categories into two categories of 
limited (sever and not sever) and not limited activities due to health problems.




This variable indicates whether the participants were covered by the National Health Insurance 
System in 2004 (ie, whether they had compulsory social health insurance). Those who replied 
in affirmative are classified as individuals with social compulsory health insurance in 2004.
Private health insurance  




These variables indicate whether the participants with no compulsory social health insurance 
had any type of private insurance in 2004. Those who replied in positive are considered as 
having private insurance in 2004. 
No insurance 
0 = health insurance 
1 = no health insurance
HC057&HC059dno
This variable indicates those who had no health insurance in 2004. Thus, those who had no 
social health insurance (HC057 = 0) and had no private health insurance (HC059dno = 1), are 
classified as having no insurance at all in 2004.
Better self-perceived health 0 = 
worse or the same health  
1 = better health
PH062 
This variable indicates whether the health status of the participant became better in 2007 
compared to 2004. In particular, participants in wave 2007 were asked the following: 
“Compared with your health when we talked with you in (month and year previous interview), 
would you say that your health is better now, about the same, or worse?” The response 
options were: 1. Better; 2. About the same; 3. Worse. Thus, those who chose the first option 
are classified as having better health status in 2007.
Worse self-perceived health 
0 = better or the same health 
1 = worse health 
PH062
This variable indicates whether the health status of the participant became worse in 2007 
compared to 2004. It is constructed using the responses to the same question as for variable 
PH062. Thus, those who chose option 3. Worse, are classified as having worse health status 
in 2007.
Non-limited GALI compared to 
2004 
0 = limited or the same  
1 = non-limited
GALI 
This variable indicates whether the limitation due to health problems was lower in 2007 
compared to 2004. It is constructed by comparing the variables GALI (see above) in wave 1 
and wave 2 and it shows the change in the global activity limitation index for each respondent 
between the two waves. Thus, those who had limitations with activity due to health problems 
in 2004 (GALI in wave 1 = 1) but had no such limitations in 2007 (GALI for wave 2 = 0), are 
classified as non-limited GALI in 2007.
Limited GALI 
0 = non-limited or the same  
1 = Limited
GALI
This variable indicates whether the limitation due to health problems was higher in 2007 
compared to 2004. It is constructed in an analogous way as variable non-limited GALI. Thus, 
those who had no limitations with activity due to health problems in 2004 (GALI in wave 1 = 
0) but had such limitations in 2007 (GALI for wave 2 = 1), are classified as limited GALI in 2007.
Better health insurance coverage
0 = worse or the same coverage
1 = better coverage
HC069
 
This variable indicates whether the insurance coverage of the participant became better in 
2007 compared to 2004. In particular, participants in wave 2007 were asked to compare their 
health insurance coverage with the one they have had during wave 2004 (previous interview). 
The question was framed as follows: “We are interested in how your health insurance may 
have changed since our last interview in [{month year previous interview}]. Taking all your 
social and health insurances into account, has anything changed, for better or for worse, in 
your coverage for health problems since [{month year previous interview}]?” The following 
response options were given: 1. No change; 2. Better coverage now; 3. Worse coverage now.
Thus, those who chose the second option are classified as having better coverage in 2007.
Worse health insurance coverage 
0 = better or the same coverage 
1 = worse coverage 
HC069
This variable indicates whether the insurance coverage of the participant became worse in 
2007 compared to 2004. It is constructed using the responses to the same question as for 
variable HC069_better. Thus, those who chose option 3. Worse coverage, are classified as 
having worse coverage in 2007.
Health insurance deductible
Measured in euro
HC054 This variable contains the responses to the question that asked participants to mention the 
amount of their health insurance deductible.
Appendix 1. Continued
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Table A2.1. Multinominal Logistic Regression for Daily Smoking
Explanatory variables







Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Age 56-64 1.09 0.60 2.00 0.70b 0.51 0.97 1.75 0.70 4.35
Age 65-74 0.54 0.25 1.15 0.37c 0.25 0.54 0.43 0.13 1.46
Age ≥75 0.06c 0.01 0.50 0.23c 0.14 0.40 0.60 0.16 2.31
Gender 0.57b 0.33 0.97 0.80 0.61 1.05 1.30 0.62 2.71
Marital status 2.06 0.79 5.37 0.63c 0.45 0.89 0.72 0.29 1.79
Change in marital status 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.17 0.56 2.45 1.74 0.37 8.15
Education 0.84 0.62 1.14 0.81b 0.69 0.95 1.05 0.69 1.60
Annual HH gross income quintile 1.04 0.82 1.33 0.98 0.86 1.11 0.75 0.53 1.08
Perceived health 1.05 0.78 1.41 0.75c 0.64 0.88 0.57b 0.36 0.91
Better perceived health 0.84 0.25 2.84 0.54b 0.30 0.98 1.47 0.46 4.68
Worse perceived health 3.30c 1.81 6.01 1.04 0.74 1.45 1.52 0.64 3.62
GALI 0.59 0.27 1.32 0.72a 0.49 1.06 0.22b 0.06 0.85
Non-limited GALI 1.81 0.75 4.39 0.88 0.55 1.41 6.71c 1.79 25.17
Limited GALI 1.14 0.56 2.32 1.25 0.86 1.83 2.46a 0.98 6.18
Health insurance deductible 1.09 0.85 1.40 0.88a 0.76 1.02 1.12 0.78 1.59
Private insurance 0.13b 0.02 0.97 0.39b 0.16 0.94 0.28 0.03 2.42
Better health insurance coverage  0.38a 0.13 1.08 0.66a 0.42 1.04 0.16a 0.02 1.25
Worse health insurance coverage 0.98 0.40 2.41 0.82 0.49 1.37 0.27 0.04 2.06
Interaction
HH income quintile* Private insurance 1.50 0.92 2.43 1.25a 0.99 1.58 1.41 0.78 2.55
N (included in analysis) 1533
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level.
The base group for multinominal regression is those who are not daily smoker in 2004 and 2007; the age groups are compared to age ≤55.
Appendix 2
 Table A2.2. Multinominal Logistic Regression for Excessive Alcohol Use
Explanatory Variables







Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Age 56-64 1.47a 0.98 2.21 1.24 0.73 2.11 1.54 0.75 3.19
Age 65-74 1.02 0.62 1.67 1.02 0.55 1.89 0.95 0.40 2.28
Age ≥75 0.67 0.34 1.33 0.54 0.23 1.29 0.24a 0.05 1.14
Gender 0.70b 0.50 0.99 0.31c 0.19 0.50 0.33c 0.17 0.63
Marital status 1.09 0.67 1.77 1.44 0.75 2.77 0.54a 0.26 1.11
Change in marital status 0.76 0.26 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.08 5.35
Education 1.15 0.94 1.40 1.11 0.87 1.43 1.37a 0.96 1.94
Annual HH gross income quintile 1.10 0.93 1.30 1.05 0.84 1.31 0.92 0.68 1.26
Perceived health 1.19a 0.99 1.44 0.94 0.73 1.21 0.96 0.68 1.36
Better perceived health 0.78 0.38 1.63 1.09 0.47 2.53 0.90 0.26 3.11
Worse perceived health 1.20 0.79 1.83 0.88 0.51 1.53 1.47 0.71 3.02
GALI 0.94 0.56 1.55 1.07 0.56 2.02 0.77 0.32 1.88
Non-limited GALI 1.07 0.59 1.94 1.17 0.57 2.40 1.45 0.52 4.00
Limited GALI 1.60b 1.02 2.50 1.88b 1.06 3.34 1.28 0.56 2.94
Health insurance deductible 1.06 0.91 1.25 0.99 0.80 1.22 1.02 0.77 1.35
Private insurance 0.23b 0.07 0.73 1.24 0.37 4.18 0.52 0.09 3.05
Better health insurance coverage  1.04 0.64 1.69 0.43a 0.18 1.02 1.17 0.50 2.75
Worse health insurance coverage 0.66 0.32 1.35 1.80a 0.93 3.51 1.59 0.60 4.25
Interaction
HH income quintile* Private insurance 1.48c 1.11 1.97 1.04 0.75 1.45 1.24 0.77 2.01
N (included in analysis) 1533
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level.
The base group for multinominal regression is those who are not excessive alcohol users in 2004 and 2007, Age groups are compared to age ≤55.
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Table A2.3. Multinominal Logistic Regression For Physical Inactivity
Explanatory Variables







Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Age 56-64 0.76 0.26 2.28 2.22 0.44 11.29 1.21 0.58 2.53
Age 65-74 2.32a 0.86 6.26 1.69 0.28 10.06 1.61 0.75 3.44
Age ≥75 4.81c 1.62 14.28 6.63b 1.25 35.21 2.97c 1.30 6.76
Gender 1.84a 0.89 3.80 1.47 0.58 3.69 1.73b 1.04 2.89
Marital status 1.66 0.69 3.98 0.70 0.26 1.91 1.32 0.71 2.47
Change in marital status 2.21 0.57 8.56 2.02 0.23 18.09 2.14 0.79 5.76
Education 1.06 0.70 1.61 0.85 0.50 1.45 0.65c 0.48 0.88
Annual HH gross income quintile 1.01 0.73 1.39 1.06 0.67 1.66 0.98 0.77 1.26
Perceived health 0.33c 0.20 0.53 0.32c 0.17 0.63 0.53c 0.38 0.73
Better perceived health 1.47 0.46 4.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.12 2.19
Worse perceived health 0.73 0.33 1.60 3.02b 1.09 8.39 1.99c 1.19 3.32
GALI 0.95 0.36 2.47 1.41 0.31 6.34 1.84 0.84 4.05
Non-limited GALI 0.47 0.15 1.50 0.29 0.03 2.39 0.65 0.29 1.46
Limited GALI 1.14 0.39 3.32 1.29 0.24 6.94 3.11c 1.45 6.66
Health insurance deductible 0.75 0.46 1.24 1.06 0.64 1.76 0.93 0.70 1.25
Private insurance 2.33 0.35 15.43 2.71 0.24 30.90 1.46 0.38 5.54
Better health insurance coverage  1.77 0.63 4.94 0.43 0.05 3.46 0.90 0.40 2.01
Worse health insurance coverage 0.79 0.21 2.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33a 0.10 1.13
Interaction
HH income quintile* Private insurance 0.77 0.43 1.36 0.84 0.40 1.77 1.09 0.74 1.61
N (included in analysis) 1533
Abbreviation: GALI, Global Activity Limitation Index.
a Significant at 10% level; b Significant at 5% level; c Significant at 1% level.
The base group for multinominal regression is those who are not physically inactive in 2004 and 2007; the age groups are compared to age ≤55.
